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Chapter 361: Ensuring Assistance for All Disaster Victims
William Kramer

Code Section Affected
Government Code § 8596 (amended).
AB 2327 (Caballero); 2008 STAT. Ch. 361.
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of California remains vulnerable to natural disasters such as
earthquakes, floods, and fires.' When these disasters strike, victims expect the
government to provide timely and effective assistance to alleviate suffering and
meet basic needs for those who emerge from the disaster helpless and confused.2
For these victims, survival becomes a first priority," and escaping to a place of
safety becomes the ultimate goal. Time is short, so grabbing identification
becomes a secondary concern.5 In these moments of crisis, disaster victims
6 Unfortunately,
expect government assistance that applies equally to all people.
• 7
the government does not always live up to these expectations.
Disaster victims experienced the government's failure on a large scale
following Hurricane Katrina in 2005,8 and to some degree, during the 2007
1. See California Combines Emergency Response Agencies, CBS13, Sept. 27, 2008, http://cbsl3.com/
local/califomia.emergency.response.2.827348.html ("Here in California we know all too well the kind of
destruction that natural disasters like floods, earthquakes and fires can cause." (quoting Governor
Schwarzenegger)).
2. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8550 (West 2005) (recognizing the State of California's responsibility to
mitigate the effects of disasters and to "protect the health and safety and preserve the lives and property of the
people of the state").
3. See Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Anna Caballero,
Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly (Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Lobaco Letter] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that when people flee their homes from a natural disaster "their first concern
is to immediately get themselves and their families to safety").
4. See id. (discussing the immediate concern to find a safe location).
5. See 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 361, § l(a) ("Individuals fleeing a disaster or coping with emergency
circumstances commonly lose access to their personal documents and identification, and replacing them during
a disaster or emergency can be burdensome, if not impossible."); Lobaco Letter, .upro note 3 ("[Tlhere is little
time for packing or grabbing important documents before evacuating a threatened area.").
6. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8550 (recognizing California's responsibility to mitigate the effect of
disasters and to "protect the health and safety and preserve the lives and property of the people of the state"); id.
(providing protection for the people of the state).
7. See generally Press Release, White House, President Asks Bush and Clinton to Assist in Hurricane
Relief (Sept. 1, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Four years after the frightening experience of
September the 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more effectise response in a time of emergency.
When the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem,
and for the solution.").
8.

See FED. GOV'T, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED (2007)

(reporting on the failures of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina). Hurricane Katrina hit the
Louisiana coastline and the city of New Orleans in August of 2005. Criticism has been leied on the federal
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wildfires in San Diego. 9 During the wildfires in San Diego, the State of California
quickly established evacuation shelters for the victims and evacuees; '° however,
hundreds of complaints revealed that not all evacuees were treated equally."
Those who found themselves without identification-either because they did not
possess any identification or discarded it while escaping the fires-were asked to
leave or were barred from entering the structure.'" Many of these victims were
minorities of Mexican or Central American descent, sparking accusations of
discrimination and controversy over illegal immigration. 3
Chapter 361 recognizes these difficulties and seeks to ensure that disaster
assistance will be available to all eligible victims during an emergency.14 All
disaster victims deserve timely and efficient protection of their health and
safety. 5 Chapter 361 will provide this protection by ensuring that
all victims,
6
assistance.
needed
receive
identification,
without
those
including
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Relevant Law
1.

Immediate versus Long-term Assistance

Federal and state agencies understand that individuals fleeing a disaster may
lose access to identification or personal documents.' 7 Therefore, agencies rarely
require identification in order to provide victims with disaster-related assistance

government's lack of preparation and mismanagement in their response to the disaster. Scott Shane, Storm and
Crisis: The Fallout;After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at Al.
The storm killed 135 people in New Orleans alone. See Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Reports
of Missing and Deceased, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that of the 1,464 people killed in Louisiana, 135 were from
New Orleans).
9. See Gillian Flaccus, 1,500 Homes Lost; $JB Loss in San Diego Area, SEAITLE TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007
(discussing that in October 2007, the San Diego area experienced wildfires which destroyed at least 1,500
homes). The ACLU received complaints that police asked evacuees for identification, and those who could not
supply identification were evicted from the shelter or not admitted at all. ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL
COUNTIES, FIRESTORM: TREATMENT OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS DURING THE SAN DIEGO FIRES 5 (2007)
[hereinafter ACLU REPORT].
10. See CITY OF SAN DIEGO,AFTER ACTION RESPONSE-OCTOBER 2007 WILDFIRES REPORT 7-8 (2008)
(evaluating the City's response to the fires and explaining the process of setting up the evacuation centers).
11. See generally ACLU REPORT, supra note 9 (reporting incidents of unequal treatment during the San
Diego wildfires).
12. Id. at 5-6.
13. See id. at 6 (noting complaints from persons of Mexican or Central American descent).
14. 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 361, § I(a)-(b).
15. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2327,
at 2 (Apr. 23, 2008).
16. Id.
17. See CtTY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 28 (emphasizing the policy that "[ildentification isn't
required for evacuee registration").
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immediately following a disaster. However, applications for long-term disaster
assistance generally require that the victim present some form of identification.' 9
Long-term assistance programs can be provided by federal, state, local, or nonprofit organizations. 0 Some examples of long-term assistance include housing
assistance, disaster loans to residents and businesses, and help with processing
insurance claims. 21
2.

The CaliforniaEmergency Services Act

The California Emergency Services Act (ESA) established the Office of
Emergency Services (OES).22 The ESA coordinates the emergency services
functions of California so the state can mitigate the effects of disasters and
protect the health and safety of the people of California." The OES helps
facilitate these goals by preparing and coordinating local governments and state
agencies for emergencies that threaten lives, property, or the resources of the
state. Under the ESA, state entities and employees must provide all possible
assistance to the director of the OES in preparing for and responding to
emergencies.'

18. See id. (recommending that victims/evacuees should not be required to present identification when
entering a shelter); Interview with Michael Gervais, Assembly Fellow, Office of Assembly Member Anna M.
Caballero, in Sacramento, Cal. (May 29, 2008) [hereinafter Gervais Interview] (notes on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining how short-term assistance normally requires no information to determine
eligibility). Examples of short term assistance include assistance like food, water, and shelter. Id.
19. See FEMA, What Information do I Need to Apply?, http://www.fema.gov/assistance/process/
index.shtm (last visited Dec. 31, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (requiring a name and social
security number to verify identification in order to receive long-term assistance). An example of long-term
assistance to disaster victims is California's State Supplemental Grant Program (SSGP) "administered by the
California Department of Social Services (CDSS) and provides grant funds to assist people who have suffered
damage in a disaster area declared by the President and when the federal assistance to Individuals and
Household Program (IHP)is implemented." Office of Emergency Services, Recovery Process-Sequence of
Delivery, http://rimsinland.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/OpenBranchContent/B7F974FIAA22BA88882
5740B00612EF3?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 4,2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). SSGP
requires applicants to have "applied to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and have received
the maximum grant from FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP)." California Department of
Social Services, The State Supplemental Grant Program, http://www.cdss.ca.gov/cdssweb/entres/forms/
English/SSGP45.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
20. See OES, Individual Assistance, http://www.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/content/A9EOA
712093245058825740B00509812?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 31, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that "assistance may come in a variety of ways," and listing examples). Examples of federal,
state, and non-profit assistances are FEMA, OES, and the International Red Cross respectively. Id.
21. See FEMA & OES, Disaster Aid Brochure, http://rimsinland.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/Client
(last
OESFileLibrary/Recovery%20-%201ndividual%2Assistance%2OForms/$fileFTri%2Foldc20wDUA.doc
visited Dec. 31, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (overviews various available long-term assistance
programs for the victims of the November 2008 California Wildfires).
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8585 (West 2005).
23. Id. § 8550.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 8587.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40
Recently, Chapter 372, legislation signed into law along with Chapter 361,
merged the OES and the Office of Homeland Security into the California
Emergency Management Agency (CEMA).26 The CEMA will oversee and
coordinate the emergency preparedness and response recovery duties of the OES,
in addition to homeland security activities.27 Governor Schwarzenegger
announced that combining the two offices will improve the state's ability to
respond to disasters.28
B. The 2007 San Diego Fires
During the infamous San Diego Fires of 2007, Qualcomm Stadium was
converted into an evacuation center for evacuees and victims. 29 In a report
following the wildfires, the City of San Diego claimed that its number one
priority was the safety and security of victims and ensuring that no one was
"denied access or services and few questions were asked of the people coming to
seek shelter."30 However, complaints from individuals at Qualcomm contradicted
such claims.3
Some victims and evacuees stated that they were asked to show identification
in order to access supplies or use the shelter. 2 Specifically, the ACLU reported
that at around midnight, San Diego City police officers walked around the
stadium, woke up families, and asked for identification.33 Families that were
unable to provide identification were forced to leave the evacuation center in the
middle of the night.34 The next morning, the police made the same request to
evacuees attempting to enter the stadium.35 The police explained that
identification was needed to ensure only true evacuees were using the evacuation
center.3 6 Although the City's report failed to mention these incidents, the report
did acknowledge that the situation in the stadium was "chaotic."37 The City's
report also recognized that by Wednesday, October 23, 2007 (the day victims say
the identification checks began), City staff had developed an "independent
registration form" used to "gain control of who was inside [the stadium]."38
26. California Combines Emergency Response Agencies, supra note 1.
27. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 38, at 2 (Aug. 19, 2008).
28. California Combines Emergency Response Agencies, supra note 1.
29. Solomon Moore, Stadium Provides ReliefAmid the Fires,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A20.
30. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 27.
31. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-14 (listing reported civil liberties issues during the 2007 San
Diego wildfires).
32. See id. at 4-9 (describing the problems evacuees faced with the police and border control); Gervais
Interview, supra note 18 (stating that the OES had received similar reports).
33. ACLU REPORT, supranote 9, at 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 28.
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Some evacuees, especially minorities, felt the police targeted and
discriminated against them.39 Over a dozen evacuees told the International Red
Cross (IRC) that they were afraid to leave the stadium because they feared police
harassment outside; and more than half a dozen evacuees reported that police
officers approached them while carrying donated supplies to their cars. 40 A
majority of these complaints came from minorities of Mexican or Central
American descent.4 ' For example, "five police officers surrounded a family in a
parking lot and asked them to account for" the items they were carrying to their
car, implying the family had stolen the supplies.4 2 Additionally, an IRC volunteer
observed police approach a single African-American mother of three and accuse
her of stealing supplies.4 '3 The fear of possible immigration inspection kept some
evacuees from leaving the stadium" and others from entering the stadium.45 Such
fears proved legitimate when the police handed over six people to immigration
officials after they were detained for suspected theft 6
The ACLU compiled these accounts and various others into one report
regarding the human rights and civil liberties compromised during the 2007 San
Diego Wildfire.47 The report concluded with the following recommendations: the
immediate "cessation of identity checks in the disbursement of emergency
shelter, food water and other supplies during a disaster;" the temporary cessation
of immigration patrols at evacuation centers to allow the relief effort to focus on
providing victims with the necessary assistance; and a commitment from civic
leaders that all disaster victims can access assistance "without fear of
apprehension, inspection, or disparate treatment." 8 Taking these recommendations
into account, Chapter 361 seeks to avoid the compromises to human rights and
civil liberties that victims of the 2007 San Diego Wildfires had to endure.49

39. ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id. at 7.
45. See Richard Marosi & Ari B. Bloomekatz, Evacuation Raise Deportation Fears, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2007, http://theenvelope.latimes.com/la-me-border28oct28,0,900968.story (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (discussing a fire victim who decided not to go to the shelter for fear of deportation).
46. Randal C. Archibold & Will Carless, Glare of Fires Pulls Migrants From Shadows, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2007, at Al; see also ACLU REPORT, supra note 9 ("Although San Diego Police Department policy
prohibits officers from calling in Border Patrol unless a criminal charge has been lodged, police in this instance
violated that policy and called in Border Patrol without lodging a formal charge.").
47. See generally ACLU REPORT, supra note 9 (discussing the infringement upon human rights and civil
liberties).
48. Id. at 28.
49. See Gervais Interview, supra note 18 (explaining the reasons for introducing the bill).
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III. CHAPTER 361
Motivating its decision to enact Chapter 361, the Legislature found that
persons fleeing a disaster often lose access to their personal identification,0 and
that replacing this information during the disaster can be difficult, if not
impossible." The Legislature further found that it is critical that all disaster
evacuees and other victims receive timely and effective assistance to alleviate
suffering and meet basic needs. 2 Responding to these legislative findings,
Chapter 361 requires all entities providing disaster-related services to strive to
provide all victims with the assistance they need and are eligible to receive."
Chapter 361 also requires public employees to assist victims in securing
"disaster-related services and assistance" without requiring unnecessary
information to determine eligibility under state and federal law.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 361
Chapter 361 received overwhelming support"" from organizations that
promote equality and want to ensure that "during a disaster-related emergency,
relief and recovery services are available to all disaster victims in a fair and
expeditious manner. 5 6 Supporters hope to avoid another situation like that which
took place at the Qualcomm Stadium during the 2007 San Diego wildfires.57
Chapter 361 accomplishes this goal by clearly stating the policy of California that
during an emergency, all entities performing disaster related work shall strive to
ensure that all victims receive necessary assistance." To avoid expelling or
blocking any victims from receiving needed assistance, Chapter 361 also
prohibits public employees assisting evacuees and other victims from eliciting
any information or documents that are not strictly necessary to determine

50. 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 361, § l(a).
51. Id. Finding replacement identification is especially difficult for "vulnerable populations, such as
low-income individuals, seniors, or persons with disabilities." Id.
52. Id.
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8596(c) (amended by Chapter 361).
54. Id. (amended by Chapter 361).
55.

See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB

2327, at 4-5 (Apr. 23, 2008) (listing 30 different organizations in support including the ACLU, American Red
Cross, and several religious, international, and immigration organizations).
56. Lobaco Letter, supra note 3.
57. See id. (emphasizing the ACLU's support for Chapter 361 and the unfortunate events of the 2007
San Diego wildfires).
58. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 8596(c) (amended by Chapter 361) ("Entities providing disaster-related
services and assistance shall strive to ensure that all victims receive the assistance that they need and for which
they are eligible.").
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eligibility for such assistance. 9 This includes identification cards, which some
victims either do not possess or may lose in an effort to escape disaster
The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) was Chapter 361's sole
opponent.6 The CDPH argued that Chapter 361 is "overly broad" and may
conflict with established codes and guidelines that oversee emergencies. 6 The
CDPH interpreted Chapter 361 as setting broad expectations that would be
difficult to meet during a major emergency situation and could expose the state to
liability. 63 While CDPH's own guidelines emphasize a population-based care
during emergencies, Chapter 361 emphasizes individual-based care. 64 Such a
contradiction in policy led the CDPH to oppose Chapter 361.65
Because the CDPH did not voice its opposition until four months after the
bill's introduction,"6 Chapter 361's supporters, including many human-rights and
minority-rights organizations, 7 did not provide a direct rebuttal to the CDPH's
claims. Instead, supporters argued that the requests for identification during the
to intentionally or
San Diego wildfires were not required by law, but were •used
61
In
response to these
inadvertently restrict access to critical emergency services.
events, Chapter 361's supporters claimed that Chapter 361 would allow
emergency workers to assist the needs of victims in a simple and practical
69
manner.
V. CONCLUSION

When disaster strikes, people often forget their differences and come together
to help others in need. The state normally responds by establishing shelters where
volunteers and state employees work together to provide safety and protection 0

59.
60.

61.
62.

Id.
See Gervais Interview, supra note 18 (explaining the reasons for introducing AB 2327).
SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2327, at 6 (June 16, 2008).
Id. at 6-7.

63. Id. at 7.
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. The bill was introduced on Feb. 21, 2008. See AB 2327, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008) (as introduced
on Feb. 21, 2008). The first mention of the CDPH's opposition was in a June bill analysis. See SENATE FLOOR,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2327, at 6 (June 16, 2008). All thirty recorded supporters of the bill had sent in

their letters of support by Apr. 23, 2008. See

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION,
COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2327, at 4-5 (Apr. 23, 2008) (listing all thirty supporters). Thus, none of the

letters of support addressed the CDPH's claims.
67. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2327, at 2 (Apr. 23, 2008) (listing the organizations that supported Chapter 361).
68. See Letter from Larisa Casillas, Dir., Bay Area Immigrant Rights Coal., to Anna Caballero,
Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing
the misuse of requiring identification).
69. Letter from Elsa Quezada, Chairperson, Cal. Found. for Indep. Living Ctrs., to Anna Caballero,
Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly (Apr. 22, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
70. See CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 7-8 (evaluating the City's response to the fires, and
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to alleviate suffering and meet the basic needs of victims." In emergency
situations, not all evacuees will have the time to gather their identification before
fleeing for safety.72 Additionally, while immigration is a controversial issue in the
United States," most people agree on the need to provide assistance to all victims
of disaster.74
Chapter 361 codifies the lessons learned from the 2007 San Diego Fires and
seeks to ensure that disaster assistance will be available to all eligible victims
during an emergency.75 Ultimately, Chapter 361 will provide timely and efficient
protection to disaster victims irrespective of their ability to provide
identification.76

explaining the process of setting up the evacuation centers).
71. 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 361, § l(b).
72. See supra note 5.
73. See Immigration: The Perpetual Controversy, Apr. 1996, http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/
flashbks/immigr/immigint.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[A]rticles on immigration...
demonstrate that immigration has always been an incendiary issue, even during bygone eras of expansion and
optimism.").
74. See ACLU, Governor Signs Important Disaster Victim Protection Bill, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.
aclu.org/immigrants/gen/37006prs20080929.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the
passage of the bill and the view of supporters, including Reshma Shamasunder, Executive Director of the
California Immigrant Policy Center, who said "[i]t is critical that immigrant populations and others feel
confident that when a disaster strikes they, just like all other residents of our state, can secure the help they and
their families so urgently need").
75. 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 361, § l(a)-(b).
76. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2327,
at 2 (Apr. 23, 2008).

